We set up and test a simple model of spurious product differentiation in a duopoly market. In our model, partly inspired by Anderson and Renault (2006), each firm offers one good to boundedly rational consumers that have homogeneous preferences. Firms decide simultaneously on the number of quality attributes of their good and then set their prices. The number of attributes of a good does not affect its quality or its value to the consumer but adds noise to the consumers’ perception of the net value differences of the goods offered. The model suggests that the lower quality firm will always choose the maximum number of attributes possible while the best quality firm will choose the minimum number of attributes as long as its quality advantage is large enough. The equilibrium prices and the seller profits are larger than the standard Bertrand predictions. Our results from a laboratory experiment with markets consisting of 2 buyers and 2 sellers are broadly in line with the model’s main predictions. The buyers make more mistakes and the prices and the profits of sellers are higher when the number of attributes of goods is higher. The number of attributes that a firm chooses is negatively related to the quality of the seller’s good. Compared to a benchmark treatment with simulated (perfectly rational) buyers prices and producer surplus are higher when buyers are real subjects.