Financial media are the most common information sources for retail investors. This paper investigates the reputation effect of financial journalists on capital markets. In the model, an issuing firm may bribe a journalist in exchange for favorable commentaries. Investors price the new shares based on their belief on a journalist’s honesty. The results show that the higher the journalist’s reputation, the higher will be the issuing price. There is also an positive relation between a journalist’s reputation and the amount of the bribe. Competition in the media market can improve the investment efficiency only if an honest journalist exists. If investors have doubt on the integrity of the journalist, publishing favorable reports damages his reputation even if the reports are accurate. To retain his credibility in the long run, an opportunistic journalist does not mimic the honest type, but rather randomizes his strategies between colluding and writing excessively critical articles. The results have implications for the regulation of financial media.

If you are interested in presenting your work in this seminar series, please contact the organisor.

To find an updated schedule for the upcoming seminars, see ERIM’s seminar website, which institute sponsors the seminar.