Abstract: Previous empirical and theoretical studies have proposed that corruption is linked to fairness. In particular, it has been argued that public officials are more susceptible to accepting bribes if their wage is low relative to the average wage in society. However, Abbink (2004) found no evidence supporting such a relationship in a laboratory experiment. We take a different approach and investigate the link between the wage of the public official and the wage of a potential briber. In particular, we argue that public officials are more susceptible to accepting bribes if their wage is low relative to the wage of the potential briber.

To investigate this hypothesis we run variations of Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner’s (2002) two-player experimental bribery game, where the public official’s wage is either high or low relative to the income of the briber. Public officials choose between a neutral option and a corrupt option, where the corrupt option increases the payoffs of the briber but poses a negative externality on a self-chosen charity. We find that increasing the wage of public officials dramatically reduces their corruptibility. In particular, we find that low wage public officials accept 85% of bribes, whereas high wage public officials accept only 27%.