Jonathan Levin and Liran Einav (Stanford University)
Market failures and inefficiencies due to asymmetric information have been at the heart of recent policy debates about credit markets, health insurance, and other regulatory and social programs. While the theory of asymmetric information has been well-established for decades, empirical research that attempts to identify and measure the sources and consequences of asymmetric information has blossomed only in the last decade. These lectures will cover recent work on demand, pricing, competition and regulation in markets with adverse selection and moral hazard problems, including consumer credit markets and insurance markets.
Date: June 2-4, 2014 Venue: Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam
Registration for the TI Economics Lectures by Jon Levin & Liran Einav
Deadline for registration: May 1, 2014.
For more information please contact Ms. Carine Horbach at courses@tinbergen.nl.
