12:00-12:45
Prison Talk: Why is Communication Effective in Social Dilemmas?
Simin He (University of Amsterdam)
Existing research shows that communication dramatically increases cooperation rates in social dilemmas. In our experiment we analyze factors that can explain this. By manipulating the communication possibilities for participants experimentally, we isolate the importance of three mechanisms: the opportunity to discern the intentions of the partner from her appearance and the contents of the conversation, the opportunity for participants that are lying averse to create a commitment by making a promise, and reducing the social distance between participants. We provide data from the experiment with evidence that communication effect is mostly caused by perceived ability to identify intention of other player, as well as the impact of lying aversion; but not a role for social distance. Based on the coding of the videos, we are able to determine some of the cues that participants use as a basis for their predictions. Field: experiment.
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12:45-13:30
Evaluating Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Social Experiment
Nadine Ketel (University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam)
We investigate the implications of a search period for welfare applicants on re-employment. In this period of four weeks applicants are supposed to actively search for work. To look at the implications of a search period we ran a unique field experiment in which individuals received differential treatment. We find a strong and persistent negative effect of a search period on the probability to receive welfare. The effect is significant up to six months after applying for welfare. The total amount of benefits paid out in six months is reduced by 27%. There is no spillover to other benefit schemes and the lower income from welfare benefits is almost fully (91%) compensated by more income from wages. A search period is most effective for applicants that are highly educated and younger than 40. Our findings fit in the literature that small (financial) incentives matter for welfare recipients. Field: empirical micro.