1. 12:00-12:45

Can Educational Expansion Explain Polarised Earnings? A Model of Ability and Education across Generations
Lennart Ziegler (University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam)

Abstract: T.B.A.

Field: Labor Economics

2. 12:45-13:30

Friend or Foe: Social Distance in Bribery
Jindi Zheng (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract: In this study, we investigate the role of social distance in bribery. Previous research on social distance show that people tend to be nicer towards those they feel closer to. They are also more likely to share risks in the same group, less sensitive to fairness, and more trustworthy. Up to now, this literature focuses on decision-making that do not pose ethical dilemmas. We design a lab experiment that manipulates the social distance between the potential bribers and bribees. We adopt the minimum group paradigm to create different groups and induce identities with various tasks. Social distances, represented by different group identities, enter into the experimental design as a treatment variable. In the bribery game, we propose a game with three players. Two players compete for a prize depending on their performance in a task. They can send money to the judge. A judge decides who the winner is and keeps both bribes. We propose a theoretical model that takes into account the image concerns of the judge (ethical concerns, reciprocity, and group identity). We find that in the lab on average more than 70 percent of the performers send bribes to the judge even when the bribes are non-refundable. Closeness towards in-group members is positively correlated with a higher bribe when performers are facing an in-group judge. Judges’ decisions are influenced by merit and distorted by bribes. However, the effects are significantly smaller when in-group identity is considered. (joint with Arthur Schram and Gönül Dogan)

Field: Experimental Economics