This Organizations and Markets workshop focusses on incentives with implications for the design of institutions. Randolph Sloof and Clare Leaver present work on individual behavior within specific organizational contexts. Sloof will explain findings from a lab experiment in which a manager decides whether or not delegate authority to a better-informed worker. Leaver presents results from a field experiments involving monitoring by head-teachers of Ugandan primary schools. Lukas Toth and William Kovacic focus on institutional design. Toth’s paper models political economy effects of a government agency’s head’s favorites, including specific enforcement projects and people, that may be channeled by specific agency rules. Kovacic applies leveraging theories to regulators that seek to branch out into neighboring areas of market oversight.

Program

12:30 Lunch (at TIA)

13:15 Randolph Sloof (University of Amsterdam) “Communication versus (restricted) delegation: An experimental comparison”

14:00 Clare Leaver (University of Oxford, United Kingdom) “Pay for locally monitored performance?”

15:00 Coffee break

15:15 Lukáš Tóth (University of Amsterdam) “Endogenous Institutional Design: Pet Projects, Pet Nominees and Budget Rules”

16:00 William Kovacic (George Washington University, United States) “Regulatory Leveraging”

17:00 Drinks

—————————

Please register for the workshop before 23 May 2016

Oops! We could not locate your form.