PhD Lunch Seminars Rotterdam

Speaker(s)
Michiel Souverijn (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Date
Thursday, September 4, 2014
Location
Rotterdam

The performance of teams depends not only on individual team member effort, but also on the division of tasks among team members. However, team performance may not be the only consideration that drives task allocation. Favouritism, seniority, individuals’ preferences over tasks, and fairness considerations may also play a role. We hypothesize that introducing team incentive pay results in increased performance by increasing effort as well as by changing task allocation. We conduct a field experiment among stores of a Dutch retail chain to study the effects of team incentives on performance and task allocation in teams. We find no effect of the incentive on performance. Furthermore, we find no increased emphasis on worker ability in task allocation. We further find that job satisfaction is unaffected, although workers of winning stores report significantly higher job satisfaction. Together these results imply that business continued as usual during the experiment.