Securities Offering Reform (SOR) in 2005 formalized free writing prospectus (FWP) as permittable written communication in the offering process by securities issuers. Using non-agency mortgage deals securitized following SOR, we find the surprising result that MBS deals with more usage of FWPs sufferred up to 20% higher cumulative net loss. Using textual analysis as an identification strategy, we attribute our finding to the more aggressive sales tactic associated with more FWP usage being employed for deals with more adverse information withholding. Consequently, the cumulative net loss on these deals are worse than their reported characteristics. Lending support to this explanation, we find that the FWP effect persists even after controlling for deal initial yield spreads and credit enhancements, and higher usage of FWPs are associated with increased content ambiguity in the final prospectus. The latter is a tactic often used to hedge litigation risk on undisclosed information.