This paper considers a theory of multi-sided altruism within the family, where members’ utilities depend on a weighted sum of own consumption utility and other members’ overall utilities. In both a symmetric model, where every member has the same degree of altruism, and an asymmetric model, where one member is either more or less altruistic than the rest, revealed utility functions are derived which only depend on the members’ consumption utilities. These revealed utility functions allow analysis of transfers and of public good provision within the family. In the symmetric game, it is shown that a leakage effect limits altruistic behaviour of members. As this leakage effect is smaller in larger families, it is possible that transfers and public good contributions are increasing in family size. In the asymmetric game, altruists tend to receive lower (sucker effect) and egoists to receive higher (prodigal son effect) transfers. At the same time, altruists promote transfers among thirds (contagion effect). Finally, altruists contribute more to public good provision than egoists, and the presence of egoists makes altruists contribute less to public good provision.