Abstract: In studying the effects of congestion tolling it can be important to account for heterogeneity in the preferences of drivers, as ignoring it can bias the calculated welfare gains of tolling. This paper analyses the effects of tolling, in the bottleneck model, with continuous heterogeneity in the value of time and schedule delay. The welfare gain of time-variant tolling increases with heterogeneity in the value of schedule delay; because, with heterogeneity, tolling lowers total scheduling costs. With a more heterogeneous value of time, congestion externalities are lower. Consequently, there is less to gain from tolling and are the welfare gains of tolling lower. The relative efficiencies of public (welfare maximising) and private (profit maximising) pay-lanes increase with heterogeneity in the value of schedule delay, whereas they decrease with heterogeneity in the value of time. Surprisingly, if there is not too much more heterogeneity in the value of time than in the value of schedule delay, then first-best tolling can decrease the generalised price for most users and on average. Equally surprising are the distributional effects of tolling in our model. First-best tolling is not most detrimental for the lowest values of time and schedule delay, but for those with an average value of schedule delay and a slightly larger value of time. The lowest values of time are among those who gain most from a public pay-lane.